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PRIVATE ORDERINGS
Lisa Bernstein*, Alan Morrison**, and J. Mark Ramseyery
The articles in this symposium were part of an interdisciplinary conference on
Private Orderings sponsored by the Centre for Corporate Reputation at the
University of Oxford, Saı¨d Business School, in September 2014. Through their
work, the authors explore the ways that legal and extralegal rules and institutions,
networks, reputation, and social capital interact to shape regimes of private ordering.
In The Medieval Law Merchant: The Tyranny of a Construct, Emily Kadens
argues that although private ordering may indeed be a powerful force, the classic
example used to illustrate its promise, the “story” of the medieval law merchant,
is nothing but a myth. It is, of course, a widely accepted myth that continues to
influence the development of commercial law.1 Kadens traces the origin of the
idea of a uniform and universal merchant-created custom to the seventeenth
century. She introduces evidence that casts doubt on the traditional account of
medieval trade, and provides an alternative account of the way medieval mer-
chants did business. Kadens demonstrates that merchants did not conduct trans-
national trade during the middle ages through a spontaneous private order.2
Rather, they relied on a mix of governmental actions, individual intermediaries,
private institutions, and networks of trading relationships. Town governments
heavily regulated sales, and merchants expected to be bound by the town’s laws—
laws that foreign traders learned through local information brokers, such as
innkeepers, notaries, and sales brokers. These local intermediaries also intro-
duced foreign traders into local exchange networks and thereby enabled them
to do business without any uniform and universal law merchant.3
* Wilson-Dickinson Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar, The University of
Chicago Law School, and International Research Fellow, University of Oxford, Said School of
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1 For a discussion of the role of the law merchant in the Common European Sales law, see Bernstein
(2013).
2 See also Benson (1989, p. 646–647).
3 See also Kadens (2012) (suggesting that the types of universal merchant customs whose existence the
law merchant story assumes did not exist, and would not have been expected to exist in the Medeival
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Mark Ramseyer and Lisa Bernstein make explicit the roles played by networks
and social capital in securing compliance with the law and in supporting commer-
cial exchange (roles that were implicit in Kadens’ description of medieval com-
merce). In Social Capital and the Formal Legal System: Evidence from Prefecture-
Level Data in Japan, Ramseyer, draws on verifiable proxies for social capital across
prefectures in Japan, and explores the connection between levels of social capital
and citizens’ propensity to keep their commercial promises and comply with legal
mandates. He uses the data to “identify environments where social norms both
constrain behavior and substitute for judicial enforcement.” He finds that where
“social capital is high people do indeed more willingly comply with social norms.”
They pay their debts, comply with legal mandates, and are in general less litigious
than individuals in contexts with lower levels of social capital.
In Private Ordering, Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement
Contracts: A Preliminary Study, Bernstein draws on social capital theory to
better understand contractual relations between original equipment manufac-
turers in the mid-west and their suppliers. She explores the ways that contract
provisions, contract administration mechanisms, and other formal structures
created by buyers and suppliers interact with the forces created by repeat deal-
ing, relational social capital, and the positions of buyers and suppliers in the
network of relevant firms (structural social capital), to support the creation and
maintenance of cooperative contractual relationships. She demonstrates that
together these mechanisms and social forces can adequately reduce shirking,
bond relationship-specific investment, control opportunism, and support both
joint and supplier led innovation—largely outside the shadow of the law.
Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz’s contribution, Third Party Beneficiaries and
Contractual Networks, argues that recognizing the embeddedness of certain
types of bilateral (dyadic) contracts in networks of relations should fundamen-
tally change the contexts in which efficiency-minded courts give so-called third-
party beneficiaries of contracts the right to sue on the contracts. Based on a large
sample of cases, they observe that courts applying third-party beneficiary doc-
trine tend to focus on the “intent” of the contracting parties to benefit the third
parties, and suggest that this inquiry focuses on the wrong normative question.
In their view, courts should define the class of third-party beneficiaries entitled
to sue, by looking at “whether it would [have been] ex ante profitable for the
network contracting members to serve the potential beneficiary class to which
the plaintiff belongs.” In turn, this inquiry would facilitate “optimal network
period and that the best available historical evidence shows that such customs as did exist were
highly local in nature, and rather vague in content, embodying basic equitable norms of fairness
rather than industry-specific merchant practices)
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formation and function.” Like Bernstein, they conclude that any understanding
of complex dyadic contracts among sophisticated commercial actors will be
highly incomplete unless understood in the context of the network of firms and
individuals surrounding the contracting parties.
Alan Morrison and William Wilhelm’s Trust, Reputation and Law: The
Evolution of Commitment in Investment Banking, develops a taxonomy for clas-
sifying various governance mechanisms between the poles of legal and private
order. Morrison and Wilhelm then draw on this taxonomy to explore how
technological change in the investment-banking industry contributed to
changes in the ways that relationships between banks and their clients are
governed. They document the shift from governance based on informal under-
standings backed by implicit reputation-based sanctions toward governance
achieved through formal, arms-length, legal constraints. They then explore
the challenges posed by this shift for the application of legal doctrines and
the choices faced by regulatory policymakers.
Picking up on the theme of how approaches to public law and regulation
might be affected by a better understanding of the forces of private order, in
Herding Towards Rationality: Following Others to Debias Anticipated Regret,
Jennifer Arlen and Stephan Tontrup caution that behavioral law and economics
scholars have too quickly encouraged law makers to intervene in private order-
ings, when the decisions that give rise to these orderings may be affected by
cognitive bias. In the real world where people are making decisions that matter
to them, argue Arlen and Tontrup, they frequently realize how these biases may
affect their decision-making. As a result, they both can, and do, take steps to
debias their decisions. To illustrate this process, Arlen and Tontrup present a
series of laboratory experiments demonstrating that regret bias (which is at the
heart of the status quo bias and endowment effect) can be, and in the experi-
mental context they study is, counteracted by another bias—the so-called herd-
ing bias. They conclude that lawmakers must take the interaction among biases
and individuals’ awareness of the ways these forces might affect their decisions
into account before intervening on paternalistic grounds.
Industry and trade associations can work publicly and privately to increase the
security of property rights. They can also work publicly and privately to transfer
rents from others to themselves. In Business Associations, Lobbying, and
Endogenous Institutions, Maria Larrain and Jens Pru¨fer ask when associations do
the former, and when the latter. They note that the marginal returns to increased
property right security fall as that security rises: the better the legal structure, the
lower the returns to improving it further. They then model the dynamic by which
industry and trade associations shift from efforts to increase property rights (good
lobbying) to efforts to extract and transfer rents (bad lobbying) as the efficiency of
the institutional environment (the strength of property rights) increases. If the
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state does not adequately secure property rights, associations will themselves try to
increase the security of property rights. But as the security of those property rights
increases, they will turn instead to rent-seeking.
In Building Legal Order in Ancient Athens, Barry Weingast, Gillian Hadfield,
and Frederica Carugati challenge prevailing distinctions between public order-
ing and private ordering. The article provides a detailed account of how Athens
was able to achieve stability, order, and growth– the outcomes usually asso-
ciated with centralized legal institutions–without creating the types of formal
courts, prosecutors, and judges that scholars commonly assume to be necessary
to the operation of such institutions. They conclude that an understanding of
how order was achieved in ancient Athens suggests that the development of
legal order in “weakly centralized developing countries” may turn less on
formal legal institutions, and more on decentralized and impersonal institu-
tions that communicate information about how people behave, and therefore
create incentives to adhere to social norms.
All of the papers at the conference were enriched by the remarks of the
commentators—John Armour, Douglas Baird, Ronald Burt, Hugh Collins
Avinash Dixit, Joshua Getzler, Bentley MacLeod, Catherine Mitchell,
Jonathan Morgan, Andrew Tuch—who challenged the authors to think outside
the boxes of their respective disciplines.
As conference organizers, we hoped that bringing together scholars with a wide
variety of methodological perspectives would expand the scholarly conversation
on private order. We could not have been more pleased. And if the conference
yielded any one lesson, it was that the social forces and institutions that make
private ordering effective can and do operate in contexts that are not character-
ized by the conditions that the legal literature commonly associates with their
success such as small, geographically concentrated, socially or ethnically homo-
genous groups. Rather, the effects of social networks, interpersonal relationships,
reputation, and private institutions are considerations that need to be routinely
taken into account by courts, policymakers, and lawyers drafting contracts if they
are to make either profit maximizing, or social welfare maximizing decisions.
REFERENCES
Benson, Bruce L. 1989. The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law. 55 S.
Econ. J. 644, 646–647.
Bernstein, Lisa. 2013. An (Un)Common Frame of Reference: An American
Perspective on the Jurisprudence of the CESL. 50 C.M.L. Rev. 169.
Kadens, Emily. 2012. The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant. 90 Tex. L. Rev.
1153.
250 ~ Editorial
 at Serials D
epartm
ent on N
ovem
ber 1, 2016
http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
